How Optimism’s draft manual silently strips tokenholder elections

The Optimism Foundation wants its elected Security Council Lead to nominate the body's members, replacing cohort elections with a system in which candidates take their seats unless tokenholders assemble enough OP voting power to veto them.

The Oct. 22 ratification proposal would give the elected Council Lead responsibility for recruiting, interviewing, and nominating the participants who carry out protocol upgrades and respond to security emergencies. The Token House, Optimism's tokenholder governance body, would keep the right to veto each nominee and remove the Lead.

The proposed authority concerns choosing who is put forward for signing roles, with opponents needing 20% of active votable OP supply to block an appointment.

As of Oct. 25, the linked rewrite was still marked Draft, while the main-branch Operating Manual remained at v2.0.0.

Under the proposal's action plan, ratification would precede a Lead election, the changes would take effect with that election, and existing signers would remain until their replacements were confirmed.

Under the proposed Council Appointment process, the Lead would put forward each nominee separately. Each candidate would receive one week for review, followed by one week for veto voting.

A veto reaching the threshold would prevent that candidate from being seated. The Lead would have to nominate a replacement through a new proposal, and the general appeals process would not apply. Blocking one nominee would not affect other appointments.

The Foundation presents the shift as a response to recruiting and assessment problems. It says too few candidates self-nominate, strong candidates may avoid campaigning, and delegates lack the means to conduct thorough candidate reviews and interviews.

The Lead's assessment would become the starting point for membership. Delegates could challenge qualifications, affiliations, or conflicts during review, but candidates would not have to win an affirmative election against alternatives.

The current Operating Manual defines votable supply as OP that has been delegated so it can participate in governance.

It considers that supply active when the delegated voting power has been used within the previous six months, and snapshots voting power when a voting period begins. The 20% threshold refers to active delegated voting power.

The proposed manual also expressly exempts veto proposals from the ordinary 30% turnout quorum. The appointment's separate 20% veto threshold would still apply.

These rules establish how opposition must be assembled, but the percentage alone cannot show whether a veto would be practically easy or difficult. That would depend on the relevant voting-power snapshot and the ability of opponents to organize during the veto week.

The proposal changes what delegates must do: they would need to identify a concern and gather sufficient voting power before the default appointment proceeds.

The proposed Member Selection Criteria would constrain both individual candidates and the Council's overall composition.

At least half the participants would have to come from outside Optimism Core Development teams. No more than one participant could be directly associated with a single entity.