Google AI agents audit Signal’s code and one major flaw stays hidden
Public Lean proofs expose both the software guarantees and the assumptions behind them. Read the full story on CryptoSlateUnderstand the crypto stories that matter and what to watch next. Get The Catalyst in your inbox
Google DeepMind researchers say their AI agents produced mathematical proofs linking specific security guarantees to a compiled build of Signal’s encryption library, and they put the resulting evidence online for others to check.
The Nov. 10 AlphaProof Code report describes about 6.5 million lines of machine-checked Lean proof code. The result concerns a particular build of libsignal, the Signal protocol’s implementation, under explicit assumptions about cryptography and the environment in which the code runs.
The authors say five people worked on the proofs over four weeks. Humans directed the work, selected reference models and reviewed the specifications that defined what the agents had to prove.
The target was an AArch64 Linux executable using libsignal-protocol v0.105.4 and SPQR v1.6.0 inside a small command-line harness. The theorems cover session initialization, sending a message, and receiving one. Key generation falls outside that verified scope.
The Google report connects the compiled executable to specified properties of PQXDH and Triple Ratchet one-to-one messaging, including forward secrecy, authentication, and post-compromise security.
These address whether earlier messages stay secret after keys are stolen, whether senders are authentic, and whether a session can regain secrecy after a compromise.
Its two proof models provide different assurances: the symbolic analysis relies on idealized cryptographic operations and collision-free executions, while the computational analysis bounds the success of classical attackers under stated cryptographic assumptions.
The symbolic proof establishes handshake secrecy under specified later breaks of Diffie-Hellman, but the computational proof does not cover quantum attackers. Group messaging is outside the report’s scope, and the computational model excludes multi-device state. Its bounds also stop providing a useful guarantee at sufficiently large workloads.