Global Securities Watchdog Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Blockchains and Finance

Bitcoin Magazine Global Securities Watchdog Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Blockchains and Finance The global securities regulators’ body says quantum computers could break today’s cryptography, and that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant security will be especially hard. This post Global Securities Watchdog Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Blockchains and Finance first appeared on Bitcoin Magazine and is written by Micah Zimmerman.

Global Securities Watchdog Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Blockchains and Finance

The International Organization of Securities Commissions, the global body for securities regulators, published a 63-page report on Thursday warning that quantum computing is a “significant medium to long-term cybersecurity challenge” for financial markets, and that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may be especially hard.

IOSCO said no practical quantum computer capable of compromising widely used cryptography exists today. “The scale and duration of the transition mean the financial sector should start preparing today,” said Jean-Paul Servais, chair of the IOSCO board, in the release. The final report drew on a survey of IOSCO members and interviews with industry experts and market participants.

The group found that preparedness across the financial sector remains at an early stage. Most firms are still raising awareness, setting up governance and taking inventory of the cryptography they use, while migration testing and rollout are limited. Firms cited reliance on third parties, interoperability, limited expertise and unclear timelines as common obstacles.

IOSCO said the problem is sharper for public blockchains because cryptography is built into their core design. Replacing it requires hard forks and coordinated action across thousands of independent validators and node operators, and decentralized networks have no way to force a fast upgrade. The report said that could make any migration “slow and fragmented.”

The report also flagged the cost of the new cryptography. It said signatures from ML-DSA-44, a post-quantum standard from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, run about 2,420 bytes, roughly 35 to 40 times larger than the 64-byte signatures common today. That could strain throughput, storage and fees. IOSCO cited testing on Solana’s quantum-resistant testnet that showed throughput falling by about 90%.

On exposed coins, the report said a capable attacker could derive private keys from public keys that are already visible on a network, and that uneven migration could leave those assets vulnerable. It singled out dormant or abandoned assets tied to exposed keys, which may be hard to move if the holders cannot be identified or cannot act.

IOSCO did not mention bitcoin by name. The report’s blockchain examples were Ethereum, Solana and Tron.

Timing remains uncertain. IOSCO said conservative estimates put computers capable of breaking today’s cryptography in the 2030–2035 window, but several industry participants argued firms should prepare for the possibility that such machines emerge within the next five years, potentially sped up by artificial intelligence. The report also warned of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, in which data collected today is unlocked later.

The report stopped short of setting rules. It urged firms to start migrating to post-quantum cryptography and to build “crypto-agility,” the ability to swap out cryptography without a major redesign. It also told securities regulators to watch for “quantum washing,” where companies overstate what their quantum products can do, and said IOSCO will keep quantum as a priority in 2027.

Bitcoin’s exposure is well documented. Jameson Lopp estimated in May that about 6.93 million BTC, or 34.6% of the supply, sat in outputs with exposed public keys, including old pay-to-public-key coins from Bitcoin’s early years and addresses that have been reused. He also argued in Bitcoin Magazine in September that the debate is about how to minimize property-rights failures, not simply whether to freeze vulnerable coins.

Developers have drafted proposals, but none is active. BIP 360 would add a Taproot-like output type with no exposed public key, and BTQ Technologies has deployed it on a separate test network. Lopp co-authored BIP 361, a draft that would phase out legacy signatures, though he has said the next steps for now do not include it. BIP 360 does not protect coins whose keys are already exposed.

Lopp made the same point about urgency in that essay: “Waiting until a quantum attacker is visible will leave us with the worst set of possible choices.”

Originally published by bitcoinmagazine Aggregated for informational purposes. All rights belong to the original publisher.
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